Recent studies indicate that expertise with objects can interfere with face processing. Although competition occurs between faces and objects of expertise, it remains unclear whether this reflects an expertise-specific bottleneck or the fact that objects of expertise grab attention and thereby consume more central resources. We investigated the perceptual costs of expertise by measuring visual thresholds for identifying targets embedded within RSVP sequences presented at varying temporal rates. Car experts and novices searched for face targets among face and car distractors, or watch targets among watch and car distractors. Remarkably, car experts were slower than novices at identifying faces among task-irrelevant cars, yet faster than novices at identifying watches among cars. This suggests that car expertise leads to greater functional overlap between cars and faces while reducing the functional overlap between cars and objects, a result incompatible with the notion of an encapsulated module for exclusive processing of faces.
Introduction
Much has been written about whether faces and objects recruit distinct perceptual systems. Expertise at individuating objects from a visually similar category is thought to recruit similar processing strategies as face perception (Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997) . Although faces and objects of expertise can elicit similar neural responses (Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000; Xu, 2005) , such similarities cannot exclude a domain-specific, informationencapsulated face processing module. For example, faces and objects of expertise might be represented by neighboring but independent cortical regions. Recent studies have provided stronger evidence against modularity by showing that objects of expertise interfere with face processing (Gauthier, Curran, Curby, & Collins, 2003; Rossion, Collins, Goffaux, & Curran, 2007; Rossion, Kung, & Tarr, 2004) .
However, such interference could arise in dual-task situations because participants favor attending to objects of expertise over other stimuli. Even when objects of expertise are task-irrelevant, they could compete with concurrent face perception simply because they grab attention (Awh et al., 2004; Ro, Russell, & Lavie, 2001; Vuilleumier, 2000) and thus would be expected to interfere with concurrent processing of any other object, rather than faces specifically. Alternatively, Gauthier et al. (2003) proposed a more specific bottleneck rooted in the holistic processes typically engaged by faces but not other objects (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997) . This hypothesis suggests that objects of expertise should interfere with face processing but not with general object processing -a prediction tested here for the first time. 
